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A NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF WAGE 
ARREARS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 










The paper proposes a theory of the wage arrears phenomenon in 
transition economies. We build on the standard one-sector neoclassical growth 
model. The neoclassical firms in transition make losses and use wage arrears as 
the survival strategy. At the agents' level, the randomness in the timing and extent 
of wage payments act as idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. We calibrate the model 
to reproduce evidence from the Ukrainian data and assess its quantitative 
implications. We find that wage arrears imply substantial social costs such as the 
consumption loss of 8% - 16% and the welfare loss from idiosyncratic 
uncertainty, equivalent to an additional consumption loss of 1% - 6%. 
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Wage arrears are wage payments that were not settled at their due date.
Wage arrears are not typically observed in developed market economies,
where wages are punctually paid to workers. The problem of wage arrears
is, however, severe in the former Soviet Union transition economies.1 For
example, in Ukraine, the average level of wage arrears was around 22% of
quarterly output during 1996-2001; in 1996, wage arrears constituted around
40% of the yearly salary (i.e., the average wage debt was equal to ﬁve monthly
salaries); and they aﬀected more than 60% of the labor force.2 This situation
continues up to now, and only recent economic growth in Ukraine seems to
reduce wage arrears.
A large body of empirical literature has investigated the determinants of
the wage arrears phenomenon. The existence of wage arrears was attributed
to liquidity problems, such as the lack of external ﬁnance available to enter-
prises, and the non-payment by customers for the goods delivered (Alfandari
and Shaﬀer, 1996, Clarke, 1998); to the opportunistic behavior of managers
who practice wage payment delays to pursue their personal interests, e.g., to
make workers sell their shares in enterprises (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002);
to the willingness of workers to accept wage-cuts in order to preserve their
jobs (Layard and Richter, 1995); to the attempt by managers to extract
tax concessions from the government (Alfandari and Shaﬀer, 1996); to the
”survival” strategy of loss-making enterprises (Desai and Idson, 2000), etc.
The empirical literature found that wage arrears play an important role
in individual consumption-savings decisions. Desai and Idson (1998, 2000)
emphasized that wage arrears not only reduce the household’s disposable in-
come in a given period, but also undercut the household’s wealth, as wage
arrears are not indexed by inﬂation. Lehmann and Wadsworth (2001) found
that wage arrears can increase the conventional measures of earnings inequal-
ity by 20 − 30%. Desai and Idson (2000) provided empirical evidence that
Russian families protect themselves from wage payment delays by borrowing
from relatives, selling family assets, reducing savings rates, holding multiple
jobs, etc. A theoretical framework for studying the impact of wage arrears
1There exist other kinds of arrears in transition economies, e.g., arrears between enter-
prises, arrears of enterprises to banks, tax arrears of enterprises, pension arrears.
2Similar tendencies are observed regarding wage arrears in Russia (see Alfandari and
Shaﬀer, 1996, Clarke, 1998, Desai and Idson, 2000, Earle and Sabirianova, 2002).
3on the consumers’ behavior has not yet been proposed in the literature.3
In this paper, we develop a theory of wage arrears, which allows us both
to explain the determinants of the wage arrears phenomenon and to assess
the eﬀect of wage arrears on the individual consumption-savings behavior. In
our model, wage arrears arise because ﬁrms, hit by negative shocks associated
with transition, incur losses and cover the losses by underpaying wages to
workers.4 We assume that wage arrears depreciate over time, which allows us
to capture the fact that wage arrears in transition economies were often not
indexed by inﬂation. At the individual level, the randomness in the timing
a n de x t e n to fw a g ep a y m e n t sa c ta si d i o s y n c r a t i cs h o c k st oe a r n i n g s .M a r k e t s
are incomplete: agents cannot borrow beyond a certain limit and cannot
insure themselves against idiosyncratic uncertainty. Thus, the consumer side
of our economy is the same as in the standard one-sector neoclassical growth
model except that in our case, ﬂuctuations in individual wages come from
wage arrears shocks, while in the standard case, they come from productivity
shocks, e.g., Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1993, 1997).
The eﬀect of wage arrears on the individual’s consumption-savings behav-
ior can be summarized by two types of costs. First, delays in wage payments
lead to a reduction in the expected capital and labor income of agents, thus
lowering their consumption. Capital income decreases because of the precau-
tionary savings eﬀect, and labor income decreases because of the depreciation
of wage arrears. Secondly, the non-regularity of wage payments, together
with borrowing restrictions, leads to variations in the amount of resources
available to agents in each period, which induces consumption ﬂuctuations.
We calibrate the model to reproduce empirical evidence from the Ukrainian
aggregate and household data and assess the quantitative expression of the
eﬀects associated with wage arrears. Our ﬁndings are as follows: The model
w i t ht h ew a g ea r r e a r ss h o c k sc a ng e n e r a t ea p p r o x i m a t e l yt h es a m ed e g r e e so f
wealth, income and consumption inequality as those produced by the stan-
dard neoclassical growth model with productivity shocks (see, e.g., Aiyagari,
1994). As far as the social costs of wage arrears are concerned, in our experi-
3Earle and Sabirianova (2000) presented a formal model, in which high and persistent
wage arrears can arise in equilibrium as an outcome of managerial decisions. However,
their paper does not explicitly consider the consumer side of the economy.
4This mechanism agrees with our empirical evidence from the Ukrainian data. It is also
in line with the view of Desai and Idson (2000) who argue that ”wage arrears in Russia
could have declined and disappeared over time if nonviable units were identiﬁed, declared
bankrupt, and folded or reorganized...” (Desai and Idson, 2000, p.25).
4ments, the reduction in the agent’s expected consumption due to wage arrears
ranges from 8% to 16%. The welfare loss resulting from consumption ﬂuc-
tuations is equivalent to an additional consumption loss, which ranges from
1% to 6% depending on the degree of the agents’ assumed risk-aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents empirical evidence
on wage arrears in the Ukrainian economy. Section 3 formulates the model.
Section 4 discusses the methodology of the quantitative study and presents
the results from simulations, and ﬁnally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Arrears in Ukraine: empirical evidence
In this section, we provide empirical evidence about arrears in Ukraine from
both aggregate and household data and discuss the relation between wage
arrears and inter-enterprise arrears . T h ea g g r e g a t et i m es e r i e sc o m ef r o m
the data-base of the Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center
(UEPLAC), and the household data are taken from the ”Ukraine-96” survey.
The description of the data used is provided in Appendix A.
The aggregate dynamics of the Ukrainian arrears over 1994-2001 are il-
lustrated in Figure 1. ”Gross payables” and ”gross receivables” are de-
ﬁned as the sum of the real debt of and to economic agents, respectively;
”net payables” is the diﬀerence between gross payables and gross receivables;
”wage arrears” is the real wage debt of enterprises to workers. For the sake
of comparison, we also plot the real output.
The ﬁrst thing to notice in the ﬁgure is that the total amount of debt in
Ukraine increased dramatically over the sample period: gross payables rose
from a half of quarterly output in 1994 to two quarterly outputs in 2000.
However, the increment in gross payables is not necessarily an indication of
poor economic performance. According to estimates by the National Bank
of Ukraine, three quarters of gross payables in 1996 were trade credits (i.e.,
inter-enterprise arrears). Trade credits are cheap and convenient substitutes
for bank credits and are commonly observed in developed market economies.
Trade credits are particularly useful in transition economies where ﬁnancial
institutions are underdeveloped. The current level of trade credits in per-
c e n t a g eo fG N Pi nU k r a i n ei sc o m p a r a b l et ot h a to fF r a n c eo rJ a p a n . 5
5See Alfandari and Schaﬀer (1996, Table 5) for a comparison of the size of trade credits
across countries.
5What appears to be a relevant problem for the Ukrainian economy is the
presence of a large net debt. As is evident from Figure 1, gross payables
systematically exceeded gross receivables; average net payables amounted to
35.46% of quarterly output.6 This indebtedness is a direct consequence of
the adverse eﬀects of transition on the Ukrainian producers. On one hand,
the typical enterprise faced a reduction in demand for (prices of) its products
because of an increase in foreign competition and because of the break-up
of the Soviet Union; on the other hand, it faced an increase in the prices of
inputs (especially, energy and primary resources) because of the economy’s
opening up. According to the Ukrainian National Bank, 84% of net debt
in 1996 was concentrated in manufacturing, agriculture and the coal sector,
whereas 78% of net credits belonged to input suppliers such as energy, oil
and gas sectors, which indicates that many enterprises were not able to pay
back for the inputs used. In the report of UEPLAC (2001), the following
conclusion is reached: ”...the onset of transition and the shock in relative
prices resulted in a signiﬁcant part of their industry producing negative value
added”, so that the growth of net arrears ”... reﬂects the continuous presence
of loss-making enterprises which continue their operations by ﬁnancing them
with a growing stock of debt” (see UEPLAC, 2001, page 60).
A sc a nb es e e nf r o mFigure 1, wage arrears constituted a large fraction
of Ukrainian net arrears. To be more precise, wage arrears, on average,
amounted to 22.44% of quarterly output over the period 1996-2001, which
corresponds to 2/3 of the Ukrainian net arrears.7 We therefore conclude
that the debt burden of the Ukrainian enterprises was essentially laid upon
workers by means of wage arrears.
Similarly to the aggregate time series data, household data reveal that
Ukrainian wage arrears is both a large-scale and a long-run phenomenon.
We have the following evidence from the ”Ukraine-96” household survey: in
1996, the wage arrears of the average Ukrainian worker amounted to 39.36%
of the yearly wage, which implies almost a 5-month wages debt per year and
per worker; wage arrears aﬀected 66.3% o ft h ea g e n t si n t e r v i e w e d ;a n d7.14%
of the agents reported wage arrears that exceeded the average yearly wage.
Another piece of evidence on Ukrainian wage arrears is provided by Lukya-
6Alfandari and Schaﬀer (1996, Table 5) reported payables and receivables for diﬀerent
countries. For the typical developed market economy, receivables are larger than payables.
The largest net receivables are observed in Japan and amount to 15% of yearly output.
7Except for wage arrears, net arrears include tax arrears, arrears of enterprises to banks
and pension arrears.
6nenko et al. (2002) from the 1999 ”Ukraine Small and Medium Enterprises
Survey”. In this household data set, 66.4% of employees experienced wage
arrears; 38% of employees faced wage delays ranging from 1 to 3 months; and
18% of employees reported wage delays exceeding one year.
To conclude this section, we summarize the key regularities observed in
the Ukrainian data as follows: During the process of transition, many of the
Ukrainian enterprises incurred losses. The debt burden of enterprises was
mostly shifted to workers.8 For a long time, the Ukrainian economy has had
a large, roughly stationary stock of wage arrears.9 In the next section, we
present a formal model, which reproduces the above regularities.
3T h e m o d e l
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ T, where T = {0,1,2,...}.
The economy consists of a continuum of ﬁrms and a continuum of inﬁnitely-
lived consumers. Both, ﬁrms and consumers, have their names uniformly
distributed on a closed interval [0,1].10
3.1 The ﬁrms
The ﬁrms own identical production technologies that convert capital and
labor into output. Each ﬁrm chooses demand for capital input, Kt,a n d
labor input, Nt, to maximize expected period-by-period proﬁts, taking the
interest rate, R,a n dw a g e ,W,a sg i v e n . 11 The level of output depends on
an additive idiosyncratic shock, θt, which is independently and identically
distributed across ﬁrms and over time. Thus, the ﬁrm solves the following
8In fact, delays in wage payments also help enterprises to reduce eﬀective wages because
wage arrears were not fully indexed by inﬂation. Layard and Richter (1995) argued that
workers were willing to accept wage-cuts in order to preserve their jobs.
9A similar empirical observation about wage arrears in Russia is made in Lehmann
and Wadsworth (2001): ”...since 1996 the stock of wage arrears has been approximately
in a steady state, equivalent to two month wage bill. This means that the amount of
contractual wages not paid to (some) workers in month t roughly equals to the amount of
wage debts paid back to (some) workers in month t.”
10This assumption implies that the average and aggregate quantities coincide.
11Here, and further in the text, variables whose equilibrium values are common for all
ﬁrms are denoted by capital letters, and those whose values are ﬁrm-speciﬁca r ed e n o t e d




E [F (Kt,N t) − dKt − RKt − WN t − θt], (1)
where E is the unconditional expectation, and d ∈ (0,1] is the depreciation
rate of capital. The production function F has constant returns to scale, is
strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes
the appropriate Inada conditions.
The proﬁt maximization conditions, which follow from (1),i m p l yt h a t
the factor prices are equal to the corresponding marginal products:
R = F1 (Kt,N t) − d, W = F2 (Kt,N t), (2)
where F1 and F2 are the ﬁrst-order partial derivatives of the production
function F with respect to capital and labor inputs, respectively.
With the assumption of constant returns to scale and in the absence
of idiosyncratic shocks, θt =0 ,t h eﬁrm makes zero proﬁt. When θt > 0
(θt < 0),t h eﬁrm makes negative (positive) proﬁt. We assume that the ﬁrm
ﬁrst pays for capital and then for labor, and also, that the output of the ﬁrm
is always suﬃcient to cover depreciation of capital and its rental price, i.e.,
F (Kt,N t) − θt ≥ (d + R)Kt. Thus, the eﬀective wage per unit of labor is
ωt =[ F (Kt,N t) − θt − (d + R)Kt]/Nt = W − θt/Nt. (3)
Wages that are (over-paid) under-paid to workers are (subtracted from)
added to the stock of wage arrears,
qt = qt−1 (1 − dq)+θt, (4)
where qt d e n o t e st h es t o c ko fw a g ea r r e a r sa tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt. We assume
that qt is bounded, i.e., qt ∈ Q ≡ [0,q] ⊂ R for all t. The depreciation rate
of wage arrears is dq ∈ (0,1].
The assumption that the stock of wage arrears depreciates, allows us
to account for the previously mentioned fact that, in transition economies,
wage arrears were not appropriately indexed by inﬂation, so that a delay
in wage payment resulted in the reduction of the real value of wage debt.
Furthermore, some wage arrears were not paid at all, either because ﬁrms go
bankrupt or because workers quit their jobs and loose the right to claim the
debt.
8In order to capture the fact that the typical ﬁrm in a transition economy is
a loss-maker, we shall assume that the idiosyncratic shock, θt, is, on average,
positive, E [θt] > 0. By assumption, the process for θt is exogenous and
cannot be aﬀected by actions of the ﬁrm. However, note that even if we
allow the ﬁrm to reduce θt at zero cost, it would have no incentives to do
so. This is because the ﬁrm shifts all losses to workers and makes the same
eﬀective (zero) proﬁt, independently of the amount of wage arrears.12
3.2 The consumers
Each agent is matched with one ﬁrm and supplies inelastically one unit of
her (non-valued) time to production, Nt =1 . The contractual wage of agent
is W, however, her eﬀective wage is ωt. The evolution of the debt of the ﬁrm
to the worker (wage arrears) is described by (4). Our assumptions imply that
the distribution of eﬀective wages is the same for all ﬁrms, and thus, agents
have no incentives to change their jobs even if they are paid less than the
amount speciﬁed in the contract.
The agent saves in the form of real assets. Income from assets is Rat,
where at is the current individual asset holdings. Assets are restricted to
being in the set A =[ −a,a] ⊂ R, i.e., the agent is allowed to borrow only
up to a certain amount a ≥ 0. The agent seeks to maximize the expected
discounted sum of one-period utilities by choosing an optimal path for con-
sumption, {ct}
∞
t=0. The period utility function u(c) is continuously diﬀer-
entiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes the Inada type of
condition lim
c→0u  (c)=∞. Consumption is restricted to being non-negative.










ct + at+1 = ωt +( 1+R)at, (6)
12In fact, there is ample evidence in the empirical literature that managers tend to ex-
ploit the phenomenon of wage arrears in their own interests, e.g., to extract tax concessions
from the government (Alfandari and Shaﬀer, 1996), to make the workers sell their shares
in the ﬁrm (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002).
9at+1 ≥ a, (7)
where initial condition (a0,q −1,ω0) is given.13 Here, Et denotes the expecta-
tion, conditional on all information about the agent’s wage payments avail-
able at t,a n dδ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. To ensure the existence of a
solution to the consumer’s problem, we shall require that δ(1 + R) < 1.
The consumer’s problem, in our model with wage arrears, is identical
to the one in the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model by Aiya-
gari (1994), except that, in our case, ﬂuctuations in the individual wage is
the result of delays in wage payments and not of idiosyncratic shocks to
productivities, as assumed in Aiyagari (1994). We shall also note that, in
our economy, the individual state is characterized by three state variables,
(at,q t−1,ωt), while in Aiyagari’s (1994) economy, it is described by two state
variables, (at,s t),w h e r est is an idiosyncratic shock to productivity.
We restrict our attention to a recursive solution to the agent’s problem,
such that the agent makes consumption-savings decisions according to the
same decision rule in all periods. It turns out that we can reduce the number
of state variables from three to two with the following change of variables:
  at = at + a, (8)
zt = ωt +( 1+R)  at − Ra. (9)
The variable zt can be interpreted as the total amount of resources that is
available to the agent in period t.I n t e r m s o f(8) and (9), we can re-write
constraints (6) and (7), respectively, as follows:
ct +  at+1 = zt, (10)
  at ≥ 0. (11)
L e tu sd e n o t eb yV (z,q) the optimal value function for the agent with
the total resources z and wage arrears q. The recursive formulation of the
problem (3) − (7) is then as follows:
V (z,q)= m a x
  a ∈[a,a]
{u(z −  a
 )+δE [V (z
 ,q
 ) | q]} (12)





  = ω
  +( 1+R)  a
  − Ra. (13)
The problem (12), (13) deﬁnes the optimal asset demand function,   a  ≡
A(z,q). We assume that such a function exists and is unique, and also that
it is continuous and diﬀerentiable.
By calculating the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the problem (12), (13),w e
obtain the Euler equation
u
  (c) ≥ δE {u
  (c
 )(1+R)}, (14)
where c = z −   a ,a n du  denotes the marginal utility of consumption. The
Euler equation (14) holds with equality if the borrowing restriction is non-
binding, a  >a , and it holds with inequality if the limit on borrowing is
reached, a  = a.
3.3 Equilibrium
Let λ be a probability measure deﬁned on B, where B denotes the Borel
subset of the set of all possible individual states Z × Q. For all B ∈ B,
λt (B) i st h em a s so fa g e n t sw h o s ei n d i v i d u a ls t a t e sl i ei nB at time t. Given
that λt is a probability measure, the total mass of agents is equal to 1.
Denote by P (z,q,B) the conditional probability that an agent with state
(z,q) will have an individual state lying in set B in the next period. The
function P is deﬁned as
P (z,q,B)=Prob({q
  ∈ Q :[ z
 ,q
 ] ∈ B}|q).
Then, the law of motion of λt is: λt+1 (B)=
 
Z×Q P (z,q,B)dλt for all t ∈ T
and all B ∈ B.
The fact that there is a continuum of agents guarantees that the mass
of agents with the shock q  at t +1and the shock q at t is equal to the
conditional probability, Prob(q  | q).S i n c eqt+1 follows a ﬁrst-order Markov
process, such probability depends only on the recent past and is the same in
all periods. Hence, the aggregate amount of wage arrears is constant.
We only study the equilibria in which the period-t+1probability measure
λt+1 i st h es a m ea st h ep e r i o d - t probability measure λt, for all t ∈ T. In this
case, we say that the probability measure is stationary and denote it by λ
∗.
11The stationarity of λ




∗ for all t, (even though the asset holdings of each agent vary
stochastically over time).
Deﬁnition. A stationary equilibrium is deﬁned as a stationary probability
measure λ







∗ for all B ∈ B;
(2) A(z,q) solves (13), (14) f o rag i v e np a i ro fp r i c e s(R,W);
(3) (R,W) satisfy the proﬁt maximization conditions in (2) with Nt =1 ;









In this section, we describe the methodology of our numerical study and
present the results. The description of the Ukrainian aggregate and house-
hold data used is provided in Appendix A.
4.1 Methodology
We choose the model’s period as one year and calibrate the model to re-
produce several basic observations on the Ukrainian economy. With the
assumption of stationarity of the wage and wage arrears distributions, we






W = Ω + Qdq, (16)
where Ω and σω (Q and σq) are the mean and the standard deviation of the
wage distribution (the wage arrears distribution), respectively.14 Thus, the
14To derive (15), we shall assume that the current individual wages are uncorrelated
with past wage arrears. To check the empirical validity of this assumption, we compute
this correlation with Ukrainian household data and ﬁnd that it is, indeed, low (about
0.05).








We calculate Ω, Q, σω and σq by using the data from the ”Ukraine-96”
household survey and compute dq, W and ψq according to (15), (16) and
(17), respectively. The results are reported in the upper row of Table1.
We assume that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type,
F (K,N)=KαN1−α = F (K,1) = Kα. We calibrate the remaining pa-
rameters {α, d, δ} so that, in the non-stochastic steady state, the model
reproduces the following four statistics of the Ukrainian economy: the share
of labor income in production, Y L/Y, the consumption to output ratio, C/Y,
the capital to output ratio, K/Y , and the wage arrears to output ratio, Q/Y .




.W i t h
wage arrears, agents do not get all the labor income earned but only a fraction









Furthermore, equations (2) − (4), (6) yield
d =
1 − (C/Y) − dq (Q/Y )
(K/Y )
. (19)
Finally, the Euler equation (14) implies
δ =
1
1 − d + α(Y/K)
. (20)
We estimate the ratios Y L/Y, C/Y, K/Y and Q/Y from the Ukrainian
time series data and compute α, d and δ from equations (18), (19) and (20),
respectively. We report the results in the lower row of Table1.
The debt limit is set at zero, a =0 . We assume that the agent’s mo-
mentary utility function is of the Constant Relative Risk-Aversion (CRRA)
type, u(c)=c1−γ−1
1−γ with γ > 0.T h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk-aversion, γ,
is not identiﬁed by our calibration procedure. We consider four alternative
values of this parameter, such as γ ∈ {0.5, 1, 3, 10}. Our benchmark value
is γ =1 , which corresponds to the limiting logarithmic case, u(c)=l n( c).
13To compute numerical solutions, we assume that individual eﬀective wages
are drawn from a Normal distribution, ωt ∼ N (Ω,σ2
ω) and approximate the
process for wage arrears (4) by a 5-state Markov chain. We illustrate the re-
sulting approximation in Figures3 and 4, and we provide the matrix of the
transitional probabilities and the corresponding unconditional probabilities
of states in Table2. A description of the solution procedure is elaborated in
Appendix B. We illustrate the properties of the solutions obtained in Figures
5 − 8 and report the statistics generated by the model in Table3.
4.2 Results
We begin by describing the quantitative implications of our benchmark model
(see column ”BM” in Table 3). To illustrate the distributional predictions
of the model, we provide several inequality measures of the distributions of
wages, assets and consumption. As we can see, idiosyncratic uncertainty as-
sociated with wage arrears leads to a signiﬁcant dispersion in eﬀective wages
across workers. For instance, the bottom 40% wage group gets 20% of the
total wages in the economy, while the top 1% wage group earns 2% of the
total wages; the Gini coeﬃcient of the wage distribution is 0.27. The inequal-
ity in assets and consumption occurs as a result of the wage inequality. The
dispersion in assets across agents is much higher than that in consumption.
For example, the bottom 40% asset group holds 21.8% of the total assets,
and the top 1% asset group holds 2.6%, while the respective consumption
groups consume 33% and 1.6% of the total amount of consumption. The
same regularity can be appreciated by looking at the normalized standard
deviations and the Gini coeﬃcients, which are 0.496 and 0.275, respectively,
for the asset distribution, and which are 0.165 and 0.105,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,f o r
the consumption distribution.15 Hence, our model predicts that risk-averse
agents smooth consumption ﬂuctuations by accumulating assets in high-wage
states and dissaving in low-wage states.16
The fact that assets are more dispersed across agents than consumption
15In fact, the degrees of wealth, income and consumption inequality in our model with
wage arrears are very similar to those generated by the standard neoclassical growth model
with productivity shocks (see, e.g., Aiyagari, 1994).
16This implication of the model agrees with the empirical ﬁndings of Desai and Idson
(2000) that in Russia, agents who were owed wages were more likely to engage ”in various
forms of dissaving including borrowing, selling family consumer durable items and other
assets, and drawing down accumulated savings” (Desai and Idson, 2000, p.218).
14Table 1. Selected statistics for Ukrainian economy and the implied model’s parameters.  
 
Ukrainian household data: 1996
a 
 
Q, krb  σ q, krb  Prob(qt>0)  Ω , krb  σ ω , krb  dq  ψ q  σ q 
18674.6  31574.5 0.6630 47446.5  26859.2 0.4743  0.8427  0.4770 
 
Ukrainian aggregate time series: 1994-2001
b 
 
C/Y K/Y  Y
L/Y Q/Y D/Y  d  α   δ  
0.7261 3.1663 0.4477 0.2244 0.3546 0.0865 0.4687 0.9420 
Notes: 
aSource: “Ukraine-96” Project, Kiev International Institute of Sociology.  






Table 2. Markov chain and unconditional actual and fitted distribution of arrears
a.  






q1=0    0.5204    0.3634    0.2267    0.1250    0.0605    0.3457    0.5164 
q2=0.3633    0.2714    0.2965    0.2780    0.2238    0.1546    0.2691    0.3106 
q3=0.7266    0.1505    0.2198    0.2756    0.2966    0.2740    0.2200    0.1016 
q4=1.0899    0.0577    0.1202    0.1572    0.2263    0.2795    0.1264    0.0283 
q5=1.4533         0         0    0.0624    0.1283    0.2314    0.0389    0.0431 
Notes: 
aWage arrears are expressed in terms of the contractual market-clearing wage, W.  
b”Prob(qi) fitted” is an unconditional probability distribution of wage arrears generated by the constructed 
Markov chain and ”Prob(qi) actual” is an unconditional probability distribution of wage arrears generated by 
Ukrainian household data. Source: “Ukraine-96” Project, Kiev International Institute of Sociology. 






















Figure 1. Aggregate output and wage arrears.
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Figures 3, 4: Benchmark parameterization, d
q=0.4743, ψ
q=0.8427, σ
q=0.4770.  can be also seen from Figures 7 and 8, in which we plot the simulated
probability distributions of assets and wage arrears, and consumption and
wage arrears, respectively. In particular, it can be seen that consumption
is always strictly positive, while assets occasionally reach a zero borrowing
limit. The household survey we have does not contain information about the
individual consumption and asset holdings. There is, however, information
about the respondents’ own evaluations of their material status, relative to
that of other people (see Appendix A for the description of this data). In
Figure2, we plot the joint distribution of this variable and wage arrears (and
we interpret it to be the empirical distribution of assets and wage arrears).
The comparison of Figure2 and Figure7 shows that there is a certain degree
of similarity between the empirical and simulated distributions of assets and
wage arrears.
We next explore how wage arrears aﬀect the aggregate model’s variables.






∗ = RK + Ω. (21)
As far as capital income, RK, is concerned, uncertainty about the time
and amount of wage payments, together with the restriction on borrowing,
makes the agents increase their savings. As we see from Table 3,t h er i s e
in the aggregate capital stock due to precautionary savings, ∆K,a m o u n t s
to 2.936%.17 The interest rate is inversely related to the aggregate capital
stock, R = αKα−1 − d, so that its value is lower in our economy with wage
arrears than in the one without wage arrears. The total eﬀect of wage arrears
on capital income is negative, ∆(RK)=−0.985%.
Labor income is given by (16) with W =( 1− α)K1−α.T h e r e a r e t w o
eﬀects here. First, the marginal product of labor goes up because capital
stock rises due to precautionary savings, ∆W =1 .387%. Secondly, the wage
reduces by the amount of dqQ because of the depreciation of wage arrears.
The second eﬀect dominates the ﬁrst one, ∆Ω = −20.360%.
17Here, and further in the text, we denote by ∆X the percentage diﬀerence between the
mean of a variable X in the model with wage arrears and its non-stochastic steady state
value, Xss, i.e., ∆X ≡ X−Xss
Xss × 100. Note that the non-stochastic steady state can be
computed analytically. In particular, the steady state capital stock, Kss, can be computed
from the steady state expression of the Euler equation, 1=δ
 




other aggregate variables can also be readily computed.




























R,%  5.928 6.042 5.447 3.780 5.813 4.027 5.926  5.920  5.900  5.915 
∆ K,%  2.936 1.433 9.645  38.961 3.708 2.084 2.588  3.038  3.309  3.100 
∆ (RK),%  -0.855 -0.417 -2.961  -14.664 -2.058 -1.334 -1.106  -0.885  -0.965  -0.903 
∆ W,%  1.387 0.690 4.432  16.697 1.333 0.969 1.277  1.434  1.559  1.463 
∆Ω ,%  -20.360 -20.907 -17.968  -8.332 -20.396 -20.670 -20.486  -20.964  -25.165  -21.095 
∆ I,%  -15.120 -15.403 -13.935 -10.025 -16.914 -16.358 -15.574  -15.570  -18.666  -15.670 
∆ C,%  -12.845 -13.096 -11.771  -8.229 -14.201 -14.329 -13.406  -13.257  -16.264  -13.322 
∆
uC,%  -13.803 -13.563 -14.323 -14.123 -14.723 -14.963 -14.243  -14.203  -17.243  -14.283 
∆
uC-∆ C,%  -0.958 -0.467 -2.552 -5.894 -0.522 -0.634 -0.836  -0.946  -0.979  -0.961 
The distribution of wages 
std(ω )/ω   0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492  0.490  0.546  0.525 
corr(ω ,q)  0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113  0.106  0.091  0.126 
0-40%  20.330 20.330 20.330 20.330 20.330 20.330 20.330  20.502  17.760  18.920 
80-100%  32.143 32.143 32.143 32.143 32.143 32.143 32.143  31.765  34.378  32.942 
90-95%  8.141 8.141 8.141 8.141 8.141 8.141 8.141  8.053  8.714  8.370 
95-99%  7.178 7.178 7.178 7.178 7.178 7.178 7.178  7.050  7.744  7.390 
99-100%  1.988 1.988 1.988 1.988 1.988 1.988 1.988  1.935  2.152  2.025 
Gini(ω )  0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.274  0.270  0.313  0.292 
The distribution of assets 
std(a)/a  0.496 0.504 0.464 0.370 0.469 0.494 0.475  0.492  0.498  0.492 
corr(a,q)  -0.175 -0.173 -0.182 -0.205 -0.283 -0.156 -0.224  -0.167  -0.187  -0.182 
0-40%  21.777 21.512 22.874 26.155 22.820 21.921 22.558  21.945  21.686  21.929 
80-100%  35.141 35.406 34.111 31.108 34.117 35.129 34.418  35.021  35.156  35.011 
90-95%  8.897 8.964 8.632 7.854 8.633 8.888 8.708  8.867  8.902  8.861 
95-99%  8.388 8.472 8.076 7.179 8.094 8.397 8.179  8.355  8.384  8.348 
99-100%  2.647 2.678 2.524 2.181 2.542 2.659 2.570  2.633  2.641  2.629 
Gini(a)  0.275 0.279 0.257 0.207 0.259 0.273 0.263  0.272  0.275  0.272 
The distribution of consumption 
std(c)/c  0.165 0.168 0.153 0.116 0.126 0.139 0.141  0.166  0.174  0.166 
corr(c,q)  -0.163 -0.161 -0.171 -0.193 -0.274 -0.147 -0.212  -0.159  -0.178  -0.168 
0-40%  32.969 32.841 33.533 35.190 34.442 34.079 34.001  32.953  32.543  32.915 
80-100%  25.423 25.539 24.929 23.535 24.029 24.553 24.546  25.410  25.711  25.423 
90-95%  6.394 6.425 6.269 5.910 6.034 6.171 6.168  6.393  6.468  6.396 
95-99%  5.539 5.574 5.395 4.985 5.121 5.296 5.283  5.538  5.616  5.539 
99-100%  1.567 1.580 1.512 1.355 1.407 1.479 1.471  1.566  1.593  1.566 
Gini(c)  0.105 0.107 0.096 0.071 0.082 0.089 0.089  0.105  0.111  0.106 
Notes: 
aStatistics in column “BM” are those generated by the model under the benchmark parameterization: γ =1, 
α =.4687, δ =.9420, d=.0865, dq=.4743, ψ q =.8427, σ q=.4770. Statistics in each subsequent column are obtained 
when the parameter on the top of the column is set to the given value, while the other parameters are set to their 
benchmark values. Statistic “∆ X” is the percentage difference between the mean of variable Xt and its non-
stochastic steady state value, X
ss, i.e., ∆ X≡ (X-X
ss)/X
ss× 100%;  “∆
uC” is the percentage utility cost of 
consumption fluctuations computed as described in the text; “x”,  “std(x)” and “corr(x,y)” are the mean of 
variable xt, the standard deviation of variable xt and the correlation coefficient between variables xt and yt, 
respectively; “0-40%”, “80-100%”, “90-95%”, “95-99%”, “99-100%” are the percentages of variable xt owned 
by 0-40%, 80-100%, 90-95%, 95-99%, 99-100% subgroups ranked by variable xt, respectively; and, finally, 
“Gini(x)” is the Gini coefficient of the density function of variable xt.  
bTo carry out experiments reported in the last three columns, we re-compute Markov chain correspondingly. 
 It turns out that the above decrease in both capital and labor income
leads to a signiﬁc a n tr e d u c t i o ni nt o t a li n c o m e ,∆I = −15.120%. As follows
from our previous discussion, the main determinant of the income loss in our
model is a very large depreciation rate of wage arrears, dq =0 .474. Indeed,
our estimates imply that about a half of the wage bill, which was not paid to
the agent in time, is lost after a one-year delay. The high depreciation rate
we obtain for wage arrears is presumably explained by a high inﬂation rate
in Ukraine, which was, on average, equal to 63.40% p e ry e a ro v e rt h ep e r i o d
1994-2001.18
We now evaluate the social welfare loss resulting from wage arrears. So-
cial welfare falls for two reasons: First, as a result of a reduction in aggregate
income, the aggregate consumption goes down. Secondly, because of idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty about wage payments, individual consumption is volatile,
which is disliked by risk-averse agents. In the benchmark case, the aggregate
consumption loss is ∆C = −12.845%. To measure the cost of consump-
tion ﬂuctuations, we proceed as follows: We ﬁrst compute a consumption
premium, Γ, which is required for compensating the individual for the total
welfare loss associated with wage arrears
E [u(ct + Γ)] = u(C
ss), (22)
where Css denotes the non-stochastic steady state consumption in the econ-
omy without wage arrears (in Table 3,w er e p o r t∆uC ≡− Γ/Css × 100%).
We then measure the cost of the consumption ﬂuctuations as the diﬀerence
between total welfare loss and aggregate consumption loss, ∆uC−∆C,%. In
the benchmark case, we obtain the cost of consumption ﬂuctuations, which
is equal to 0.958%.19
Our next step is to investigate how our results depend on the value of
the risk-aversion coeﬃcient, γ. The introspection of the results in Table 3
18We compute the inﬂation rate, π, according to CPI1994 (1 + π)
7 = CPI2001,w h e r e
CPI1994 and CPI2001 are the consumer price indices in the years 1994 and 2001, respec-
tively, as reported by UEPLAC (2001).
19Lucas (1987) proposed measuring the cost of business cycle ﬂuctuations by a con-
sumption premium, which must be given to the agent in order to provide her with the
same utility level as the one that would be derived from the expected consumption. In
the same way, we can measure the cost of consumption ﬂuctuations by a consumption
premium Γ  satisfying E [u(ct + Γ )] = u(E [ct]).W e ﬁnd that, under this measure, the
cost of consumption ﬂuctuations is slightly higher. For example, in the benchmark case,
it is equal to 1.120%.
20reveals the following tendencies: As agents become more risk averse, they
increase their precautionary savings, which reduces the aggregate capital
income, RK, and raises the aggregate labor income, Ω.T h et o t a le ﬀect of this
on aggregate income and aggregate consumption is positive, i.e., the income
and consumption losses reduce. In contrast, the cost of the consumption
ﬂuctuations goes up. The quantitative expression of the eﬀects associated
with variations in γ can be very signiﬁcant. For instance, as γ increases
from 1 to 10, precautionary savings rise from 2.936% to 38.961%;a g g r e g a t e
income and consumption losses are reduced from 15.120% and 12.845% to
10.025% and 8.229%, respectively; and, the welfare loss from the consumption
ﬂuctuations rises from 0.958% to 5.894%.
We study the robustness of the model’s predictions with respect to changes
in α, δ, d by setting these parameters to values that are standard in macroe-
conomic literature: α =0 .36, δ =0 .96 and d =0 .1. We also analyze the
eﬀects of variations in the other parameters, speciﬁcally, a 10% increase in
dq,a10% decrease in ψq and a 10% increase in σq relative to their bench-
mark values. Overall, the quantitative implications of our model proved to
be robust to these modiﬁcations (see the last six columns in Table3).
One probable shortcoming in our analysis is that our calibration proce-
dure neglects the eﬀects associated with permanent heterogeneity in skills
(productivities) by assuming that, in the absence of wage arrears, all agents
w o u l de a r nt h es a m ew a g e ,W. We resort to this assumption because of the
data problem. Speciﬁcally, we have data on eﬀective but not on contractual
wages. In order to evaluate the extent to which our results are contaminated
by the skill heterogeneity, we compute the model’s predictions under two
alternative calibration procedures. One was to split the sample into groups
by education and to weight the wages and wage arrears of agents by the
coeﬃcients that reﬂe c tw a g ed i ﬀerentials across the educational groups dis-
tinguished. The other was to adjust the wages and wage arrears of the agents
according to the wage diﬀerentials across qualiﬁcation-profession groups. The
tendencies described in this section proved to be robust to these modiﬁca-
tions as well; and the quantitative expression of the eﬀects associated with
wage arrears was comparable to that we had under the benchmark calibration
procedure.
215C o n c l u s i o n
The phenomenon of wage arrears is an exceptional feature of transition
economies. We show however that this phenomenon can be addressed in
the context of the neoclassical growth model, which is standardly used for
studying economic issues relevant to developed market economies. We argue
that the eﬀect of wage arrears on the individual consumption-savings behav-
ior is similar to that of idiosyncratic shocks to productivity. We distinguish
two types of costs associated with wage arrears. First, there is a reduction
in eﬀective wages because of the depreciation of wage arrears, and secondly,
there is a welfare loss due to consumption ﬂuctuations. In a calibrated ver-
sion of the model, we ﬁnd that these costs are substantial: consumption falls
by 8% − 16%, and welfare loss resulting from idiosyncratic uncertainty is
equivalent to an additional consumption loss of 1% − 6%.
In our economy, wage arrears is a survival strategy of the ﬁrms that incur
losses during the transition process. In the considered setup, the ﬁrms cannot
inﬂuence the amount of the losses, so that wage arrears are perpetuated
forever. Our model has another interesting implication in this respect. Even
if the ﬁrms were able to abandon the loss making activities at zero cost (and
hence, to resolve the problem of wage arrears), they would not necessarily do
so. Indeed, the ﬁrms have no incentives to reduce losses as long as they can
shift such losses to their workers. The solution to the problem of wage arrears
would therefore be the development of economic institutions (e.g., legislation,
trade unions) which would make it diﬃcult for the ﬁrms to practice wage
arrears. On a ﬁnal note, we should express our hope that wage arrears in
transition economies will soon be a part of history.
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6 Appendices
In Appendices A and B, we provide the description of the data used and
outline the key steps of the numerical algorithm, respectively.
6.1 Appendix A
The household survey ”Ukraine 96” is carried out by Kiev International Insti-
tute of Sociology, and it contains information on 5403 Ukrainian households.
From the whole sample, we select a subsample where household heads were
employed. We restrict attention to wages and wage arrears of the household
heads on the main job (the one that brings the largest income). We deﬁne
the agent’s monthly wage as the sum of both monetary and non-monetary
compensation, as estimated by respondents, speciﬁcally,
ω
month = ZH28 + ZH31 + ZH34,
where ZH28 is the net working compensation, ZH31 is the estimated cost
of goods received, and ZH34 is the estimated cost of privileges.
24We construct the distribution of yearly wages by bootstrapping, specif-
ically, we compute the yearly wage as a sum of 12 random draws from
the constructed distribution of monthly wages, i.e., ωyear ≡
12  
i=1




. The mean and standard deviation of wages, which we report
in Table1, are computed over the sample with 1000000 observations.
The mean and standard deviation of wage arrears in Table 1 are those
of the variable Z25, which is the amount of money that the owner or the
administration owes to the household head on the main job.
To draw the empirical distribution of wealth and wage arrears in Figure
2,w eu s et h ev a r i a b l eI20, which is the individuals’ subjective evaluations of
their material status relative to the one of other people in their city (village,
town). This variable takes values from 1 to 7, which correspond to evaluations
”much lower than average”, ”lower than average”, ”a bit lower than average”,
”average”, ”a bit higher than average”, ”higher lower than average” and
”much higher than average”, respectively.
To construct the educational and profession-qualiﬁcation groups, em-
ployed for the sensitivity experiments in Section 3.2, we use the variables
E3 and ZH18, which are the education and profession (qualiﬁcation) of the
household head, respectively.
The Ukrainian aggregate data such as the GNP, personal consumption,
wages, government expenditures, wage arrears, gross payables, gross receiv-
ables, population, CPI, and PPI are quarterly time series coming from UE-
PLAC (2001). All the series except of the one for wage arrears range from
1994:1 to 2001:4; the series for wage arrears ranges from 1996:3 to 2001:4.
We convert the nominal series into the real ones by using the CPI.
As a measure of output in the model, Y ,w eu s et h ev a r i a b l eG N Pi n
the data. We deﬁne the aggregate consumption in the model, C,a st h e
sum of the personal and government consumption. The time series data on
the government consumption are not available. However, UEPLAC (2001)
provides a detailed budget of the Ukrainian government for the year 1998,
which allows us to roughly estimate how the total government expenditures
are subdivided between consumption and investment. We deﬁne the govern-
ment investment as the sum of the government expenditures on the R&D,
education, construction, health care, telecommunication, transportation and
the reserve funds, and we deﬁne the government consumption as the rest of
the government spendings. With this deﬁnition, we have that about half of
25the government expenditures goes to investment and the other half goes to
consumption (the exact estimates of the investment and consumption shares
in the total government expenditures are equal to 0.48 and 0.52, respectively).
We therefore construct the series for consumption by summing up personal
consumption and 0.52 of the total government expenditures. The aggregate
labor income in the model, Y L,i sd e ﬁned as the aggregate wage bill exclud-
ing the wages paid by collective agricultural enterprises. The estimates of
the Ukrainian capital stock, K, are available for the years 1996, 1998, 1999
and 2000 from Derzhcomstat (2000). We convert this variable into the real
terms by using the PPI.
6.2 Appendix B
To solve for the individual asset demand function, we use an algorithm that
computes a solution to the Euler equation (14) on a grid of prespeciﬁed





split this interval into H equally-spaced points {q1,...,qH}.W e t h e n c o m -
pute the transitional probabilities associated with the autoregressive process
for wage arrears (4) (i.e., the Markov chain). For each state q ∈ {q1,...,qH},
we parametrize the asset demand by a function of the currently available
resources z. The grid for the resources consists of M equally spaced points
in the range [z,z]. The minimum of resources, z,i sa c h i e v e dw h e nt h ea g e n t
has no asset holdings and receives the minimal possible labor income ω (i.e.,
faces the maximum possible increase in wage arrears, from q1 to qH). The
maximum of resources is z = ω +( 1+R)a,w h e r ea is the maximum sus-
tainable capital stock (i.e., the solution to F (a)=da), and ω is the maximal
possible labor income (i.e., the maximum possible decrease in wage arrears,
from qH to q1). In particular, our construction implies that the individual
asset holdings are restricted to be in the range [0,a]. Our baseline parame-
terization is H =5and M =1 0 0 . To evaluate the asset function outside the
grid, we use a cubic polynomial interpolation.
We employ the algorithm, which iterates on the Euler equation. By sub-
stituting consumption from the Euler equation (14) in budget constraint (10),
we obtain
  a





(1 + R)Prob(q  | q)






26where ω  = q(1 − dq)+W − q .
Consequently, we implement the following iterative procedure:
• Step 1. Fix some asset function on the grid, A(z,q).
• Step 2. Use the assumed decision rule for assets to calculate the right
side of the Euler equation (23) in each point on the grid. The left side
of the Euler equation will be the new asset function,
∼
A(z,q).







A(z,q)+( 1− η)A(z,q), η ∈ (0,1].
F o re a c hp o i n t ,s u c ht h a t
≈
A(z,q) does not belong to [0,z], set
≈
A(z,q)
equal to the corresponding boundary value.
Iterate on Steps 1−3 until the ﬁxed point is achieved with a given degree
of precision,
       
≈
A(z,q) − A(z,q)
        < 10−10,w h e r e ·  is the L2 distance.
We solve for the interest rate and wage corresponding to a given asset
function A(z,q) by computing an invariant probability distribution of the













  | q),
  a
  =
z  − (q(1 − dq)+W − q )
1+R
,
where A−1 (  a ,q)={z,   a  = A(z,q)} is the inverse of the asset demand func-
tion A(z,q).
Finally, to solve for the equilibrium ﬁxed-point interest rate (the stochas-
tic steady state), we use a bisection method proposed in Aiyagari (1994).
27